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Hoffmann: Does Implied Assumption of the Risk Exist in California's Compara

NOTES
DOES IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK EXIST
IN CALIFORNIA'S COMPARATIVE FAULT SCHEME?
THE [NOT so] DEFINITIVE ANSWER OF
KNIGHT v. JEWETT AND FORD V. GouN
The phrase 'assumption of risk' is an excellent illustration of the extent to
which uncritical use of words bedevils the law. A phrase begins life as a
literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition
soon establishes it as a legal formula, undiscriminatingly used to express
different and sometimes contradictory ideas.'
Justice Frankfurter's often quoted remark is particularly appropriate as
California and many other comparative fault jurisdictions struggle to
determine what place, if any, the affirmative defense of assumption of risk
should have in a comparative fault scheme. The California Supreme Court,

in the companion cases of Knight v. Jewett' and Ford v. Gouin,3 attempted
to clarify whether any form of implied assumption of risk survived the
adoption of comparative fault in California.
In 1975, the California Supreme Court adopted comparative fault as the
law of the state in Li v. Yellow Cab Company4 . The Li decision briefly

addressed the effect comparative fault principles would have on the
affirmative defense of assumption of the risk. However, the differing
interpretations of Li's language in subsequent court of appeal decisions
emphasizes that the court's explanation was far from clear.

After Li,

according to some courts of appeal assumption of the risk remained an
affirmative defense in a state where comparative fault principles otherwise
governed.' Commentators differed as to whether assumption of the risk as

1. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
3. 834 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1992).
4. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
5. See, e.g., Donohue v. San Francisco Housing Auth., 281 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Ct. App.
1991), review granted 282 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1991), transferred 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 849 (1992) (fire
fighter assumed the risk of slipping on a stairway during a fire safety inspection); Hacker v. City
of Glendale, 279 Cal. Rptr. 371 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted 282 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1991),
transferred 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 (1992) (experienced tree trimmer assumed the risk of
electrocution by trimming trees with power lines running through them); Krol v. Sampson, 278
Cal. Rptr. 164 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted 282 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1991), transferred 13 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 733 (1992) (experienced recreational softball player assumed the risk of being struck
by a ball during the course of a game); Nunez v. R'Bibo, 260 Cal. Rptr. I (Ct. App. 1989)
(gardener using "wobbly" ladder of homeowner assumed the risk of accident caused while
trimming trees); King v. Magnolia Homeowners Ass'n, 253 Cal. Rptr. 140 (Ct. App. 1988)
(independent contractor assumed the risk of a fall when he climbed up an unsafe ladder a second
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a bar to liability was inconsistent with comparative fault principles.'
California was not the only state to struggle with the question of assumption
of the risk in a comparative fault regime.' The issue was addressed either
statutorily" or judicially 9 in many states that adopted comparative fault
principles.
Seventeen years after Li, the California Supreme Court decided Knight

and Ford in an attempt to define the status of assumption of the risk in
California's pure comparative fault regime.

More specifically, the court

attempted to resolve the question of whether implied assumption of the risk
is a viable defense within California's comparative fault system.

This Note will address the Knight and Ford decisions. First, the Note
will give a brief introduction to the different variations of assumption of the
risk. Following the introduction, California law subsequent to Li and prior

to Knight and Ford will be summarized to illustrate the conflict among the
courts of appeal. The Note will then discuss the plurality, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in Knight and Ford. The discussion section will examine

time); Ordway v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Ct. App. 1988) (jockey assumed the risk
of injury from being thrown off her horse due to another rider's misconduct); Neinstein v. Los
Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 229 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1986) (spectator at professional baseball
game assumed the risk of being struck by a batted ball); Nelson v. Hall, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct.
App. 1985) (veterinary assistant assumed the risk of being bitten by a dog while assisting in its
treatment).
6. Compare Stephanie Wildman & John Barker, Time to Abolish Reasonable Implied
Assumption of a Reasonable Risk in California, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 647 (1991) (implied
assumption of risk should not be a separate defense in a comparative fault system); John
Diamond, Assumption of Risk After Comparative Negligence: Integrating Contract Theory into
Tort Doctrine, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 717 (1991) (implied assumption of risk should be merged with
comparative negligence while express assumption of risk should be examined under principles
of contract law); 4 FOWLER HARPER, Er AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, see. 21.0 (2d cd. 1986)
(disapproving of assumption of risk as a separate defense); and Fleming James, Assumption of
Risk. Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968) (disapproving of assumption of risk as
a separate defense) with Robert Spell, Stemming the Tide of Expanded Liability: The Coexistence
of Comparative Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 8 Miss. C. L. REV. 159 (1988) (implied
assumption of risk should bar recovery because the plaintiff should accept the consequences of
an informed choice); Paul Rosenlund & Paul Killion, Once a Wicked Sister: The ContinuingRole
of Assumption of Risk Under Comparative Faultin California, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 225 (1986)
(assumption of risk should exist as a separate defense because assumption of risk is based on
consent while comparative negligence apportions liability according to percentage of fault); John
Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REV. 5 (1961)
(assumption of risk should remain an affirmative defense because its advantages outweigh its
disadvantages and it gives appellate courts more freedom of action).
7. Comparative negligence in its pure form apportions liability according to fault even if the
plaintiff is equally at fault or more at fault than the defendant. Li, 532 P.2d at 1229.
8. VICTOR SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, Section 9.4(A) at 167 (2d ed. 1986)
(citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505(A) (1991, Pocket Part) (implied assumption of risk
merged into comparative fault system)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h(c) (West 1991)
(same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 231 § 85 (West 1985) (same); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R.
1411 (McKinney 1976) (same).
9. SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at 170 § 9.4(B) (citing Springrose v. Willmore, 192 N.W.2d
826 (Minn. 1971) (merging implied assumption of risk into comparative fault)); Wcntz v.
Deseth, 221 N.W.2d 101 (N.D. 1974); accord Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me. 1976);
Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo.
1979); Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123 (La. 1988).
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whether the plurality's holding clarifies the question before the court. The
discussion section will then analyze the contentions in the concurring and
dissenting opinions in an attempt to determine whether the California
Supreme Court did in fact resolve the conflict among the courts of appeal.
Before concluding the discussion, an alternative method of resolving the
conflict will be suggested in anticipation of continuing uncertainty on the part

of the California courts of appeal.
I. WHAT IS "ASSUMPTION OF RISK?"

Before discussing Knight and Ford, it is important to distinguish the
various definitions and distinctions inherent within the term "assumption of
risk." The broad assumption of risk definition in California is as follows:
[The defense of assumption of the risk] is available when there has been
a voluntary acceptance of a risk and such acceptance, whether express10 or
implied, has been made with knowledge and appreciation of the nsk.

Within that broad definition, different theoretical approaches are applied to
evaluate the conduct of the plaintiff and the defendant when examining a
particular fact situation. Because these approaches differ a great deal, a brief
summary of the distinctions is necessary to understand assumption of the risk

in general and more importantly assumption of the risk as it relates to the
comparative fault system in California.
The first traditional approach is to distinguish between express and
implied assumption of risk. Express assumption of the risk refers to an
acceptance of risk evidenced by written or spoken words." Express
assumption of the risk remains a complete defense in California's comparative fault scheme and is not discussed in this Note. 12 By contrast, implied
assumption of the risk refers to acceptance of risk by conduct." Some
10. Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 265 P.2d 904, 906 (Cal. 1954); accord, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 496A-496G (1965).
11. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 68 at
482-84 (5th ed. 1984).
12. Knight, 834 P.2d at 703 n.4. See also Madison v. Superior Court (Sulejmanagic), 250
Cal. Rptr. 299 (Ct. App. 1988). In Madison, the plaintiff parents brought suit on their deceased
son's behalf. The decedent had drowned while participating in a scuba diving course. Id. at
301. He had signed a release expressly releasing defendant "from any liability for their
NEGLIGENCE. " Id. at 304 (emphasis in original). The court used contract analysis in determining
the validity of the waiver. It emphasized the written release was "clear, unambiguous, and
explicit in expressing the intent of the parties." Id. (citation omitted). The court found the waiver
not to be void as against public policy. Id. at 304-05.
As Madison illustrates, express assumption of the risk involves contractually relieving
defendant of possible liability. Thus, the analysis is one of contract rather than tort. See also
Kurashige v. Indian Dunes, Inc., 246 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Ct. App. 1988) (upholding validity of
release signed by motorcycle riders relieving defendant of liability for negligence); and Coates
v. Newhall Land & Farming, Inc., 236 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Ct. App. 1987) (upholding validity of
release signed by motorcross racers relieving defendant of liability for negligence).
13. KEETON Er AL., supra note 11, at 481.
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commentators equate conduct with consent, 14 while others do not regard
conduct of the plaintiff in engaging in an activity as consent to assume the
risk of that activity. 15 The cases analyzed in this Note and the issue that has
divided courts and commentators involves the status of implied assumption
of the risk in a comparative fault jurisdiction.
Another approach is to divide assumption of risk into primary and
secondary assumption of risk. Under this approach, primary assumption of
the risk is defined as "the counterpart of the defendant's lack of duty to
protect the plaintiff from [the] risk." 6 Secondary assumption of the risk
describes the plaintiff assuming "a risk created by defendant's breach of duty
toward him, when the former deliberately chooses to encounter that risk." 7
This approach is based on the premise that assumption of risk does not exist
as a separate defense apart from contributory negligence. As referred to in
this Note, the primary/secondary assumption of risk distinction pertains only
to implied assumption of risk.
A third approach divides implied assumption of risk into two categories-reasonable and unreasonable implied assumption of the risk. This
distinction, derived in California cases from the language in Li, looks to the
reasonableness of a plaintiff in assuming a certain risk to determine whether
the plaintiff's recovery is barred. Prior to Knight and Ford, if the plaintiff's
conduct was unreasonable, then plaintiff's fault in assuming an unreasonable
risk was apportioned under the principles of comparative negligence."8
However, if the plaintiff reasonably assumed a risk, courts differed on
whether reasonable conduct was a complete bar to recovery,"9 or irrelevant
and not to be factored in when apportioning fault.'
Thus, a large part of the California Supreme Court's analysis of whether
implied assumption of the risk was a viable affirmative defense in California's comparative fault scheme depended on the court's approach to
assumption of the risk.2' The approach applied by the court would

14. Id.; see also John Fleming, Forward: Comparative Negligence at Last-By Judicial
Choice, 64 CAl. L. REV. 239 (1976); and Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 6, at 287.
15. Fleming James, Assumption of Risk- Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 190;
HARPER, ET AL., supra note 6, at 259.
16. HARPER, supra note 6, at 188-89.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Ordway v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (Ct. App. 1988); Segoviano
v. Housing Authority, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Ct. App. 1983).
19. Ordway, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
20. Segoviano, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
21. Furthermore, while this Note has attempted to set forth a brief framework of the
different approaches, one commentator perceives express assumption of the risk as analogous
to primary assumption of the risk and implied assumption of the risk as similar to secondary
assumption of the risk. See HENRY WOODS, COMPARATVE FAULT, see. 6.1 at 135 (2d ed.
1987). However, it appears from the language of the California Supreme Court that these
approaches seem to overlap in some cases but are not analogous. For instance, express
assumption of the risk refers to spoken or written words that relieve a defendant of liability.
See note 11, supra, and accompanying text. However, as this Note will demonstrate, the
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determine the status of assumption of risk as a defense in California's
comparative fault regime. However, before examining the California
Supreme Court's decisions in Knight and Ford, it is necessary to briefly
summarize the differing approaches of the California courts of appeal that
brought this issue to the high court of California.
I. CALIFORNIA LAW PRIOR TO KNIGHT AND FoRD

The California Supreme Court's adoption of comparative fault principles
in Li v. Yellow Cab did not clearly resolve the question of the continued
viability of assumption of the risk in a comparative fault regime. The court
said in speaking of assumption of the risk:
To simplify greatly, it has been observed... that in one kind of situation,
to wit, where a plaintiff unreasonably undertakes to encounter a specific
known risk imposed by a defendant's negligence, plaintiff's conduct, although he may encounter that risk in a prudent manner, is in reality a form
of contributory negligence... Other kinds of situations within the doctrine
of assumption of risk are those, for example, where plaintiff is held to
agree to relieve defendant of an obligation of reasonable conduct toward
him. Such a situation would not involve contributory negligence, but
rather a reduction of defendant's duty of care. We think it clear that the
adoption of a system of comparative negligence should entail the merger
of the defense of assumption of risk into the general scheme of assessment
of liability in proportion to fault in those particular cases in which the form
of assumption of risk involved is no more than a variant of contributory
negligence.2?

Based on the above language from Li, the courts of appeal struggled to

determine whether reasonable implied assumption of the risk remained a
viable defense under California law. Ordway v. Superior Court 4 and
Segoviano v. Housing Authorit? were two often cited cases that attempted
to determine whether the assumption of risk defense remained viable.
Segoviano stood as the only court of appeal decision to hold reasonable
implied assumption of the risk had been eliminated as a complete bar to
recovery by the adoption of comparative fault principles in California.' In
Segoviano, the plaintiff separated his shoulder in a flag football game
sponsored by the defendant housing authority.'7 The court held that a
reasonable plaintiff may not have his recovery reduced by comparative fault

primary assumption of risk approach does not require the risk be expressly assumed. Thus, the
express/implied and primary/secondary distinctions are not analogous.
22. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
23. Id. at 124041 (citations omitted).
24. 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (Ct. App. 1988).
25. 191 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Ct. App. 1983).
26. Id. at 579.
27. Id. at 580.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1992

5

California Western Law Review, Vol. 29 [1992], No. 2, Art. 4
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

principles." The court further held that a plaintiff's recovery could only
be reduced by comparative fault principles if plaintiff's assumption of the
Thus, since the plaintiff's choice to play flag
risk was unreasonable.'
football was reasonable, there was no evidence of comparative fault justifying
an apportionment of damages.'
Ordway, on the other hand, held that a plaintiff's cause of action could
be completely barred by the defense of reasonable implied assumption of the
risk.31 In Ordway, the plaintiff, a jockey, was injured when she was
thrown from her horse due to another rider's misconduct. 2 The court also
held that unreasonable assumption of the risk was not a complete bar to
recovery; rather, a plaintiff's unreasonable assumption of the risk is merged
in comparative fault principles. 3 Thus, as stated by the court:
Concededly, it does sound strange to decree that unreasonable plaintiffs
may recover and reasonable ones may not; but the problem is not of law
but of semantics. If the "reasonable-unreasonable" labels were simply
changed to "knowing and intelligent" versus4 "negligent or careless," the
concepts would be more easily understood.'

In addition to Segoviano and Ordway, one other Court of Appeal case,
not involving sports or recreation type activity, is worth mentioning. Nelson
v. HalP5 involved a plaintiff veterinary assistant who was bitten by defen-

dant's dog as she was assisting in the dog's treatment. The Nelson court held
that "[i]n certain circumstances the defense of assumption of the risk has
survived the establishment of comparative fault."36 The court further held,
much like the court in Ordway, that "where a plaintiff unreasonably
encounters a known risk-the doctrine has been subsumed by comparative
fault.""'

However, the court characterized the defense on the facts of

Nelson as: "true" or "primary" assumption of the risk whereby the defendant
is impliedly relieved of any duty of care by the plaintiff's acceptance of
employment involving a known risk or danger. 8
Though the Nelson court's decision seemed limited to employment
situations involving risk,39 its use of the term "primary" assumption of the

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 583.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
243 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 540.
211 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 672.

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. For instance, the court in Nelson, compared the occupation of veterinaiy assistants to
other risky occupations such as firefighters and police officers. 211 Cal. Rptr. at 672-73.
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risk foreshadowed the development of the law in California.
Subsequent to Segoviano, Ordway, and Nelson, California courts of
appeal were more frequently faced with the question of whether assumption
of the risk remained a viable defense after Li. 1 Frequently, courts
explicitly commented there was a lack of guidance from the California
Knight and Ford gave the California
Supreme Court on the issue."
Supreme Court the opportunity to clarify whether the affirmative defense of
assumption of the risk deserved a separate existence as a complete defense
in an otherwise comparative fault regime.
III. KNIGHT v. JEWT AND FORD v. GouiN
A. Knight v. Jewett42
The California Supreme Court used the familiar factual scenario of a
friendly football game in Knight to first address the issue.43 Several guests
at a Super Bowl party "decided to play an informal game of touch football
. . . using a 'peewee' football."" After about five or ten minutes of
playing the game, plaintiff Kendra Knight told defendant Michael Jewett to
stop playing so rough or she would stop playing the game.4" On the next
play, plaintiff sustained an injury that eventually resulted in the amputation
of her little finger.'
After three operations and the eventual amputation of her finger, plaintiff
filed suit against defendant alleging negligence, assault, and battery.47
Defendant moved for summary judgment, relying on the court of appeal
decision in Ordway v. Superior Court, which held that "reasonable implied
40. See, e.g., Hacker v. City of Glendale, 279 Cal. Rptr. 371 (Ct. App. 1991); Van Meter
v. American Motor Sports Ass'n, 278 Cal. Rptr. 288 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted282 Cal.
Rptr. 124 (1991), transferred 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 (1992); Krol v. Sampson, 278 Cal. Rptr.
164 (Ct. App. 1991); Nunez v. R'Bibo, 260 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Ct. App. 1989); and Von Beltz v.
Stuntman, Inc., 255 Cal. Rptr. 755 (Ct. App. 1989).
41. See, e.g., Hacker, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 374; Van Meter, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 292; and
Donohue, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
42. 834 P.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1992).
43. This scenario is similar to that of Segoviano. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying
text.
44. 834 P.2d at 697.
45. Id.
46. The stories differed as to how the incident actually occurred. Plaintiff contended the
injury occurred when defendant ran over the plaintiff as he was pursuing another person that had
the ball. In the process of running the plaintiff over, defendant stepped on plaintiff's hand. Id.
at 698.
Defendant recalled the incident differently. He remembered jumping up in an attempt
to intercept a pass and collided with plaintiff when he came down. He then stepped backward
onto plaintiff's hand. Id. at 697.
However, the actual manner in which the injury occurred was not critical to the outcome
of the case because the court did not consider defendant's conduct to be "so recldess as to be
totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport." Id. at 712.
47. Id. at 698.
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assumption of the risk" is still a complete defense in the era of comparative
fault." "[D]efendant asserted that '[b]y participating in [the touch football
game that resulted in her injury], plaintiff... impliedly agreed to reduce the
duty of care owed to her by defendant.'" 9
Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment motion relied on the
court of appeal decision in Segoviano v. Housing Authority, which held that
"reasonable implied assumption of the risk" had been eliminated as a
complete defense by the adoption of comparative fault principles in
California.' Plaintiff alternatively contended that, even if the court found
Ordway persuasive, defendant could still be subject to liability because his
actions were at least reckless. 1 Furthermore, plaintiff did not agree with
the characterization by defendant that she had impliedly agreed to reduce
defendant's duty of care." Defendant's reply to plaintiff's opposition
reiterated that the material facts demonstrated plaintiff was injured playing
touch football. 3 Thus, she impliedly assumed the risk of injuries that
occurred in that context.
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.'
The court of appeal affirmed.55 While recognizing the split of authority
among the courts of appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded
the holding of Ordway v. Superior Court, which maintained that "reasonable
implied assumption of the risk" remained a complete defense, should be
followed.'
The Supreme Court of California, in a plurality decision, affirmed the
decision of the court of appeal. 7 It found that plaintiff had assumed the
risk under the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk and thus could not
recover.5 In so holding, the plurality said primary assumption of the risk
remained a complete defense in a comparative fault system, while secondary
assumption of the risk merged with comparative fault principles.59
The plurality broadly framed the issue as deciding "the proper application of the assumption of the risk doctrine in light of the adoption of
comparative fault principles in Li. " I° Before addressing the issue before the

48. Id.
49. Id. at 301.
50. Id. at 698.
51. Id.
52. Id.at 698-99.
53. Id.at 699.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.at 712.
58. Id.
59. Id.at 703.
60. Id. at 699 (citation omitted).
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court, the plurality conducted a detailed review of the court's holding in

Li. 6 It then rejected the Ordway court's characterization of assumption of
the risk as either reasonable or unreasonable as a method of determining
liability. 2 Rather, the proper distinction to which the Li court referred is
whether plaintiff's actions constituted so-called primary assumption of the
risk or secondary assumption of the risk.'
The court then discussed the significance of the distinction between
primary and secondary assumption of the risk by interpreting the language
of the Li court. The court said:
[T]he distinction to which the Li court referred was between (1) those
instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal
conclusion that there is "no duty" on the part of the defendant to protect
the plaintiff from a particular risk-the category of assumption of risk that
the legal commentators generally refer to as "primary assumption of
risk"-and (2) those instances in which the defendant does owe a duty of
care to the plaintiff but the plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk of injury
most commentators
caused by the defendant's breach of that duty--what
m
have termed "secondary assumption of risk. "
After setting forth the distinction between primary and secondary
assumption of risk, the court held:
[T]he category of assumption of risk cases that is not merged into the
comparative negligence system and in which the plaintiffs recovery
continues to be completely barred involves those cases in which the
defendant's conduct did not breach a legal duty of care to the plaintiff, i.e.,
"primary assumption of risk" cases, whereas cases involving "secondary
assumption of risk" properly are merged into the comprehensive comparative fault system adopted in Li.
Thus, the court undertakes a duty analysis in deciding whether a plaintiff has
assumed the risk. If no duty exists, plaintiff's recovery is barred under
"primary assumption of risk."' If defendant does breach a duty of care,
and plaintiff knowingly encounters the risk caused by the breach, assumption
of risk remains viable only in terms of measuring comparative fault under
"secondary assumption of risk." 67
Because the existence of assumption of risk depends on the duty owed
by the defendant, the court recognized liability will be dependent "on the
nature of the activity or sport in which the defendant is engaged and the

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 700-01.
Id. at 702.
Id. at 703.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
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relationship of the defendant and the plaintiff to that activity or sport."68
In the context of a particular activity or sport, the plaintiff's voluntary action
may be a factor in apportioning liability.' However, voluntary action will
not necessarily preclude some recovery by the plaintiff for a breach of duty
by the defendant.'
Finally, after criticizing the dissent's argument, the Knight plurality
applied its rule to the facts of the case. The plurality reviewed past
assumption of risk cases from California and other jurisdictions that involved
sports related activity to determine whether a duty existed. 1 It concluded
the duty of a coparticipant in sports related activity was limited to refraining
from intentional or reckless conduct "that is totally outside the range of the
ordinary activity involved in the sport." 72 The plurality thus determined
that because no legal duty of care as to negligent conduct was owed to the
plaintiff, the case fell within the primary assumption of risk doctrine, thus
barring plaintiff's action.
Justice Mosk, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, agreed with the
court's conclusion on the facts of the case. However, Justice Mosk stated he
would go farther and "eliminate implied assumption of risk entirely" because
"[t]he all-or-nothing aspect of assumption of risk is as anachronistic as the
all-or-nothing aspect of contributory negligence." 74 Justice Mosk would
"simply apply comparative fault principles to determine liability."'
Justices Panelli and Kennard, in separate opinions, disagreed with the
plurality's reasoning. While Panelli and Kennard disagreed with each other
as to the outcome of the case, they agreed that implied assumption of risk
should constitute a complete bar to recovery. 76 Justice Kennard's dissent
was especially critical of the plurality's reasoning. Kennard accused the
plurality of advocating "a radical transformation of tort law" by "transforming an affirmative defense into an element of the plaintiff's negligence action
[thus] abolish[ing] the defense without acknowledging that it is doing so."' "
Kennard would hold that reasonable implied assumption of the risk remain
a viable defense because "a person generally should be required to accept
responsibility for the normal consequences of a freely chosen course of
conduct."78 Apportionment of liability under comparative fault principles
would only occur when plaintiff carelessly assumed a risk, whereas a
68. Id. at 704.
69. Id. at 705.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 708-10.
72. Id. at 710 (citation omitted).
73. Id.at 711-12.
74. Id. at 712.
75. Id.at 713.
76. Id.at 713-14.
77. Id.at 714.
78. Id.at 719 (citation omitted).
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plaintiff's reasoned and deliberate choice would bar recovery.79
Justice Kennard also disagreed with "the plurality's no-duty-for-sports
rule."' Therefore, even applying the plurality's new assumption of risk
scheme, Kennard would find some possible liability based on a limited duty
of the defendant and reverse the grant of summary judgment upheld by the
court of appeal."1 While agreeing that a limited duty rule may apply in an
organized sports setting, Kennard did not agree that there is an ordinary
range of activity in touch football which would justify the lack of a duty of
care on the part of the participants.'
In summary, a divided California Supreme Court held in a plurality
opinion that primary assumption of risk remains a complete bar to plaintiff's
recovery under comparative fault principles when defendant owes no duty to
plaintiff. However, secondary assumption of risk is merged into the system
of comparative fault because it involves the breach of a legal duty by the
defendant and plaintiff's knowingly encountering the risk caused by the
breach. Thus, liability should be apportioned according to fault. However,
the sharply divided court finds Justice Mosk at one end of the spectrum
advocating the total abolishment of implied assumption of risk, while Justices
Kennard and Panelli are at the other end of the spectrum advocating the
continued viability of implied assumption of the risk as a complete defense.
The plurality's opinion is an attempt to find a middle ground based on an
analysis of defendant's duty. Yet, Knight's facts only allowed the court to
analyze assumption of risk in a competitive sports situation such as flag
football. In Ford, the California Supreme Court extended its holding to
include so-called cooperative sports such as water skiing.
B. Ford v. Gouin'
In this companion case to Knight, the plaintiff, Larry C. Ford was
injured while water skiing barefoot and backward.' Ford's injury occurred
when his head struck a tree limb that extended over the channel where he
was skiing.' Defendant Jack Gouin, a friend of the plaintiff, was driving
the boat.

6

Plaintiff alleged defendant's negligence caused the accident

because defendant drove the boat too close to the riverbank.'
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment
because plaintiff had selected the particular site to ski and therefore assumed
79. Id. at 720.
80. Id.at 722.
81. Id.at 723-24.
82. Id.
83. 834 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1992).
84. Id.at 726.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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the risk." The court of appeal affirmed, holding that "reasonable implied
assumption of the risk" barred plaintiff's action.' Plaintiff sought review
relying on the holding in Segoviano which had rejected the continuing
viability of assumption of the risk in a comparative fault regime.'
The California Supreme Court reiterated its analysis of Knight. 1 It
then addressed the question of whether a substantive difference existed
between a competitive sport such as touch football and a cooperative sport
such as water skiing. 2 The court held:
[The general rule limiting the duty of care of a coparticipant in active
sports to the avoidance of intentional and reckless misconduct, applies to
participants engaged in noncompetitive93but active sports activity, such as
a ski boat driver towing a water skier.
The court thus imposed a bright line duty of care to apply to all recreational
activity participants to merely avoid reckless or intentional misconduct.'
Therefore, because defendant was not reckless in driving the boat, he did not
breach a legal duty to plaintiff." Consequently, plaintiff was barred from

recovery by the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk.'
IV. DID KNIGHT V. JEWETT AND FORD V. GotN RESOLVE THE ISSUE?

The Knight and Ford decisions are the first attempts by the California
Supreme Court since its decision in Li to address the continued viability of
implied assumption of risk in California's comparative fault regime.
However, whether the court definitively resolved the issue is not at all
clear. 97

First, the court's choice of Knight and Ford as the companion cases

88. Id. at 727.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.at 727-28.
92. Id.at 728.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The court also discussed defendant's possible duty of care under Harbors and Navigation
Code section 658, subdivision (d). The concurring and dissenting opinions disagree as to the
applicability of the statute to the fact situation. Id. at 728-31 and 741-45. However, because
this Note addresses the broader issue of the companion cases as to the continuing viability of
implied assumption of the risk, the Note will not address the issues of statutory construction
which further divided the court in Ford v. Gouin.
97. One court of appeal recently noted that Knight and Ford "have served only to further
stir up the already murky waters" of implied assumption of the risk. Lucas v. Fresno Unified
School District, No. F015104, 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 337, at *3 (March 29, 1993). The court
thus analyzed its fact situation and found triable issues of fact under all three approaches posited
in Knight and Ford, "the duty analysis, the consent-based analysis, [and] Justices Mosk's view.
Id. at *12.
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invites the question: Is the doctrine of assumption of risk limited to sports
and recreational activity? The court comprehensively decided that both
competitive and cooperative recreational activity are governed by its holdings
in Knight and Ford. Thus, looking at the recent court of appeal decisions,
the Supreme Court's analysis would definitely apply to participants in cases
involving football,98 horse racing,'

and softball." °

Of course, the as-

sumption of risk defense may traditionally be raised in many other factual
situations, often involving accidents that occur "on the job." 1"'
A careful examination of the Knight and Fordopinions reveals an intent
on the part of the California Supreme Court that its analysis of assumption
of risk be uniformly applied in all cases where the issue is raised, not just
those involving recreational activity. The Knight plurality said broadly that
the issue before the court was "the effect of the adoption of comparative
negligence on the assumption of risk doctrine. "" The court also specifically refers to the "firefighter's rule" line of cases as being another area
where "assumption of risk comes into play. " " Only after the court
resolved the issue of the viability of assumption of risk in California" a
does the court address the limited duty of participants in sporting or
recreational activity. 5 The limited duty analysis specifically addressing
sports and recreational activity does not in any way affect the broad
fundamental holding of the court regarding assumption of the risk.
For example, using the rationale of Knight, an embellished hypothetical
clarifies the reach of the plurality's holding. An employee of a moving
company certainly assumes the risk of moving heavy objects. Under the
doctrine of primary assumption of risk, the person packing boxes probably
has no duty to guard against packing a box with heavy objects. Thus, if the
mover injures his or her back because of the weight of a box, primary
assumption of risk would conceivably bar recovery. If, on the other hand,
the heavy objects are explosives, and the mover knows the boxes are packed
with explosives, the owner of the explosives has a duty to pack the
explosives with due care. Any liability for an injury caused by an explosion
because of negligent packing would probably be apportioned under

98. Segoviano v. Housing Auth., 191 Cal. Rptr. 536 (Ct. App. 1983).
99. Ordway v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Ct. App. 1988).
100. Krol v. Sampson, 278 Cal. Rptr. 164 (Ct. App. 1991).
101. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Feldsher, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 (Ct. App. 1992) (gas company
employee); Novicke v. Vons Grocery Co., 260 Cal. Rptr. 694 (Ct. App. 1989) (security guard);
Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc., 255 Cal. Rptr. 755 Ct. App. 1989) (stunt woman); Donohue v.
San Francisco Housing Auth., 281 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Ct. App. 1991) (firefighter); Hacker v. City
of Glendale, 279 Cal. Rptr. 371 (Ct. App. 1991) (tree trimmer); Nunez v. R'Bibo, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (Ct. App. 1989) (gardener); and King v. Magnolia Homeowner's Ass'n, 253 Cal. Rptr.
140 (Ct. App. 1988) (independent contractor).
102. Knight, 834 P.2d at 701.
103. Id. at 704 n.5.
104. Id. at 699-708.
105. Id. at 708-12.
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comparative fault principles using secondary assumption of risk."°
In a more realistic example, a property owner is required "to use due
care to eliminate dangerous conditions on his or her property."107 Thus,
if the ground is obviously covered with ice due to a winter storm, under the
doctrine of primary assumption of risk, the property owner probably has no
duty to guard against someone slipping on the icy walkway. However, if the
property owner negligently leaves broken glass on the walkway and someone
slips and lands on the glass, the property owner would probably have a duty
to protect against the additional injuries caused by the broken glass. Liability
would be apportioned based on percentage of fault under the principle of
secondary assumption of risk. In summary, the above hypotheticals illustrate
the rationale of Knight and Ford is applicable in fact situations that do not
involve sports or recreational activity.
The more fundamental question that must be asked is whether the court
resolved the issue of "the proper application of the assumption of risk
doctrine in light of the adoption of comparative fault principles?"" 8
According to the California Supreme Court in Knight and Ford, primary
assumption of the risk is a complete bar to recovery; " secondary assumption of the risk is merged into comparative fault.110 Thus, at least in
California, assumption of the risk appears to survive as a complete defense
in some circumstances. Or does it?
The court says cases in which a plaintiff's action continues to be barred
under primary assumption of the risk are those where the "defendant's
conduct did not breach a legal duty of care to the plaintiff.""' No breach
occurs because no duty existed. Under the court's approach, using the term
"primary assumption of the risk" is surplusage. If defendant has no duty,
plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie cause of action for negligence.
At first glance, this argument seems to be one largely of semantics.
However, the primary/secondary assumption of the risk approach was
developed by Professors Fowler Harper and Fleming James Jr."' Their
view of assumption of the risk was clear-cut: the doctrine "deserves no
separate existence" apart from comparative negligence.113 For instance,
rather than pleading the elements of the defense in California (the voluntary
acceptance of a known and appreciated risk)," 4 the defendant need only
answer a cause of action by "concentrating instead on the nature of
106. Of course, the inherently dangerous nature of explosives may involve other tort
doctrines such as strict liability. This example is for illustration purposes only.
107. Knight, 834 P.2d at 708 (citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968)).
108. Id. at 699.
109. 834 P.2d at 703, 732.
110. Id. at 703.
111. Id.
112. HARPER, Er AL., supra note 6.
113. Id. at 190
114. Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 265 P.2d 904, 906 (Cal. 1954).
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defendant's duty, its limitations if any, and the reasons for any such
limitations.""' No reference to assumption of risk is necessary. As one
article commented about adopting the primary/secondary assumption of the
risk approach of Harper and James, "To adopt their terminology thus
necessitates adopting their conclusion . . . assumption of risk does not

function as a defense independent of the existing concepts of duty and
contributory negligence." u6 The language of the California Supreme
Court's opinion does not clarify whether the court is adopting the conclusion
of Harper and James when it adopts their terminology.
The court holds that defendant's lack of duty be viewed under the rubric
of primary assumption of the risk without actually eliminating assumption of
risk as Harper and James propose. Conversely, the merger of secondary
assumption of risk into the apportionment of comparative fault is consistent
with Harper and James' conclusion that assumption of risk "deserves no
separate existence" 7 as an affirmative defense. The court's approach to
primary assumption of the risk preserves the burdensome and unnecessary
step of pleading an affirmative defense when a sufficient answer would
merely refute the existence of a duty. Maintaining the language of
assumption of risk within California's comparative fault scheme causes more
confusion than merely merging any voluntary risk on the part of the plaintiff
into allocation of comparative fault after a duty has been established.
The first case to be decided by the court of appeal after Knight and Ford
illustrates the confusion of the Plurality opinion. In Davis v. Gaschler,
the plaintiff, "an experienced breeder and handler of dogs for over ten
years,"

9

was bitten on the hand by defendant's dog as she was assisting the

injured animal. 120 Plaintiff brought causes of action for negligence and
negligent infliction of emotional distress.121 The trial court granted a
motion for summary judgment on "the ground that plaintiff's reasonable
implied assumption of the risk barred recovery."" The court of appeal
reversed because "triable issues of material fact" still existed."z While the
result in Davis may be consistent with the principles of comparative fault, the
court's reliance on Knight's language exemplifies the problem with the
California Supreme Court's approach. The Davis court said:

115. HARPER, ET AL., supra, note 6, at 225.

116. Rosenlund & Killion, supra note 6, at 234.
117. See notes 15 and 16, supra, and accompanying text.
118. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Ct. App. 1992)
119. Id. at 681.
120. Plaintiff, despite her experience with dogs, was merely giving assistance as a "Good
Samaritan." She was not under a legal duty to assist nor was she acting in the course of any
employment. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 685.
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Under Knight, . . [the defendant] had the burden to show this is a case
of primary assumption of risk-where, by virtue of the nature of the
activity and the parties' relationship to the activity, the defendants owe no
legal duty to the plaintiff...
Here,4 defendants have not shown the absence of a legal duty to plaintiff.'

The court then goes on to analyze in detail why the defendants owe
plaintiff a duty of care. The court imposes a duty on defendant for three
reasons. First, Civil Code section 3342, a dog bite statute,"z' establishes
a duty of care while not "render[ing] inapplicable such defenses as assumption of the risk.. ." ' Second, defendant had a duty to vaccinate the dog
against rabies."z Finally, the court found the "veterinarian's rule" 12 did
not apply because plaintiff was not engaged in activity for compensation
when she was injured."2 . Thus, the court's reasoning appears consistent
with established comparative fault principles in deciding whether summary
judgment is warranted in this particular case. Yet, the language of the
conclusion puts the burden of proving the "absence of a duty of care" on the
defendant by referring to the lack of a duty as the affirmative defense of
primary assumption of the risk. This shifts the burden of proving the
presence of a duty from the plaintiff's prima facie case to the defendant's
establishment of an affirmative defense."3 Thus, Davis v. Gaschler plainly
illustrates the confusion caused by the Plurality's holding that absence of a
duty is now an affirmative defense.
Justice Kennard's dissenting opinion accused the plurality of using
Knight v. Jewett "as a forum to advocate a radical transformation of tort
" ' While Justice Kennard is certainly correct in that the decision
law." 13

124. Id. at 683 (emphasis added).
125. Civil Code section 3342, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: "The owner of any
dog is liable for the damages suffered by any person who is bitten by the dog while in a public
place or lawfully in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog..
126. Davis, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 683-84 (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 684. This duty derived from plaintiff's cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress caused by having to undergo a series of inoculations for rabies after the
initial test on the dog for rabies was "equivocal." Id. at 681.
128. See Nelson v. Hall, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1985).
129. Davis, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684-85.
130. At first glance, requiring plaintiff to prove the existence of a duty of care may seem
contrary to the rules governing summary judgment. To warrant summary judgment, a defendant
must establish as a matter of law that none of plaintiff's asserted causes of action can prevail.
Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1988). However, plaintiff must still prove a
prima facie case to survive the motion for summary judgment. While it may be mere semantics,
plaintiff is responsible for establishing the existence of a duty as an element of a prima faie
case. There is no need to talk about the presence or the absence of a duty of care under the
rubric of primary assumption of the risk. It is simply a question of whether plaintiff can
establish a duty of care or defendant can negate the duty element of the prima facie case of
negligence.
131. 834 P.2d at 714.
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affects the manner in which assumption of the risk may be plead, Kennard
also appears to believe assumption of risk is an established affirmative
defense for negligence. This is the "traditional" view shared by many
scholars, including Prosser and Keeton."3 2 However, the view that assumption of risk is a well-established affirmative defense for negligence is not
without question. In fact, the preparation of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts found the advisors of the American Law Institute to be sharply divided
over whether an "Assumption of Risk" chapter should be included.133
Scholars including Prosser and [Robert] Keeton prevailed over a group that
included Deans [Page] Keeton, Wade, and Professor James." Thus, the
question of whether assumption of the risk is more than "an excellent
illustration of the extent to which uncritical use of words bedevils the
law" 3 5 is not a new debate.
As Justice Kennard's opinion illustrates, the supporters of the defense of
assumption of the risk opine that the defense is "based on consent.""
This so-called consent "will negative liability."3 7 However, this consentbased view is usually based on a legal fiction.'
"The injured party has
not truly manifested his consent to hold the defendant blameless; rather, the
law treats him as if he had done so."'39 In short, the notion that implied
assumption of risk is based on consent is simply a policy decision to limit
liability based on knowledge of a possible risk-not consent to be injured.
Under comparative negligence principles, a jury may certainly weigh
plaintiff's knowledge of a risk in apportioning fault. However, to totally bar
a plaintiff from recovery relieves defendant from any limited duty of care.
Justice Mosk's opinion in Knight recognizes that "[a]ssumption of risk
now stands for so many different legal concepts that its utility has diminished."" Rather than maintain the language of the plurality that primary
assumption of the risk remains a complete bar to recovery, Mosk would
eliminate the "anachronistic" 1" doctrine "and simply apply comparative
fault principles to determine liability." 42 Mosk's approach, referred to
throughout this note as the approach of Professors Harper and James, is
consistent with the rationale of comparative fault. The rationale of
comparative negligence seeks to avoid absolute bars to recovery. Liability
is apportioned according to fault.
132. KEETON Er AL., supra note 11, at 484.
133. See Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368, 378 n.3 (Tex. 1963).
134. Id.
135. See note 1, supra.
136. 834 P.2d at 715 (citations omitted).
137. Id. (quoting Prescott v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 265 P.2d at 906.)
138. SCHwARTZ, supra note 8, at 154.
139. Id.
140. 834 P.2d at 712.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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In sum, if there is no duty on the part of the defendant, there can be no
breach and thus no fault, as the first element of the prima facie case for
negligence has not been established. Pleading the affirmative defense of
primary assumption of risk is therefore superfluous.
V. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR CALIFORNIA TO BE A TRUE COMPARATIVE

NEGLIGENCE JURISDICTION SHOULD NOT BE WASTED
The companion cases of Knight and Ford were an opportunity for the
California Supreme Court to clarify whether implied assumption of the risk
deserved a separate existence under comparative negligence. The court
wasted the opportunity. Rather than formulating a bright line rule that makes
sense to possible litigants, a plurality of the strongly divided court succeeded
in adding confusion to an already divisive area of the law.
The court adopted the language of Professors Harper and James while
only partially accepting the theory underlying the approach. The court
accepted Harper and James' theory that secondary assumption of risk was
subsumed under comparative fault principles. However, the court held the
language of primary assumption of risk survives as a complete bar when
defendant has "no duty . . . to protect the plaintiff from a particular
Why use the language of assumption of risk? It only leads
risk. "1 "
to confusion as to whether primary assumption of risk remains an affirmative
defense. By not agreeing with Justice Mosk that implied assumption of the
risk should be eliminated altogether, the Plurality maintains it as an
affirmative defense. If primary assumption of risk derives from a lack of
duty on the part of the defendant, an affirmative defense is unnecessary; the
plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of negligence.
The division of California's Supreme Court requires a legislative
response. The plurality decisions in Knight v. Jewett'" and Ford v.
Gouin14 s emphasize the divergence of opinions among the members of the
court. Many cases were still pending in front of the supreme court on the
issue of assumption of risk within California's comparative fault scheme after
Knight and Ford were decided. However, approximately three months after
its decision, on November 30, 1992, the court transferred the pending cases
back to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of Knight.'6 Thus,

143. Id. at 703.
144. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
145. 834 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1992).
146. See 92 Bartclays CSCS (Cal. Sup. Ct. Serv.) 463-64 (Dec. 7, 1992), listing O'Donnell
v. Feldsher, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 732 (Ct. App. 1992) (transferred to the Second Appellate District,
Div. 7); Donohue v. San Francisco Housing Auth., 281 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Ct. App. 1991)
(transferred to the First Appellate District, Division Two); Hacker v. City of Glendale, 279 Cal.
Rptr. 371 (Ct. App. 1991) (transferred to the Third Appellate District); Krol v. Sampson, 6 Cal.
App. 4th 310 (1991) (transferred to the First Appellate District, Division Four); Van Meter v.
American Sports Ass'n, 278 Cal. Rptr. 288 (Ct. App. 1991) (transferred to the Fifth Appellate
District).
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possibly based on both the conflicting opinions by members of the court in
Knight and Ford, and the inability to compromise, the court will not address
the issue again soon.147
Therefore, the California Legislature needs to address the inconsistency
caused by the California Supreme Court's opinion. A clearly written statute
should be drafted that clarifies implied assumption of risk no longer exists
in California."4 Justice Kennard's dissent was correct when it stated,
"[Tihe plurality would abolish the defense without acknowledging that it is
doing so." 49 The Legislature could eliminate the confusion by specifying
implied assumption of risk is abolished as a separate defense under
California's comparative fault scheme.
The statute should specify that consistent with comparative fault
principles established in Li, 5° implied assumption of risk is no longer an
affirmative defense. Rather, any conduct on the part of the plaintiff
previously referred to as "implied primary assumption of risk" merely refers
to the absence of a duty on the part of the defendant and can be pleaded as
part of establishing the prima facie case of negligence. This approach is
preferable to a statute that lists situations where no duty exists. A statute
listing possible circumstances where no duty existed could be endless'51 and
is best addressed by established case law.
If a duty is established by the pleadings, any knowledge or appreciation
of the risk on the part of the plaintiff may serve to limit defendant's liability
under contributory negligence principles, consistent with "implied secondary
assumption of risk." Thus, an implied assumption of risk defense need not
exist apart from the establishment of a limited duty and then apportioning
liability by percentage according to fault.
Abolishing assumption of risk as an affirmative defense does not affect

147. In what might have been a significant action, the court granted review one week after
the present opinions were issued to a case questioning whether implied assumption of the risk
remained a viable defense in California. (Stimson v. Carlson, No. S027893, 1992 Cal. Lexis
4482, review granted September 3, 1992.) However, this case was also transferred back to the
court of appeal (First District, Division Four) on November 30, 1992 (1992 Cal. Lexis 5959).
148. Many other states have drafted statutes merging assumption of risk into contributory
negligence including Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506(F)(2) (1991 Supp.)),
Massachusetts (MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 231, § 85 (West 1985)), New York (N.Y. Civ.
PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976)), and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.015
(West 1988)).
However, these statutes have not specifically addressed primary assumption of risk.
Instead, many state statutes have established "no duty" rules in certain circumstances. For
instance, Utah establishes no duty for ski resort operators in some situations (UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-27-51 to 78-27-54 (Michie 1992)).
149. Knight, 834 P.2d at 714.
150. 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
151. Furthermore, California case law already specifies no duty in some situations. For
instance, the "Fireman's Rule" (Lipson v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 822 (Cal. 1982)), the
"Veterinarian's Rule" (Nelson v. Hall, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. App. 1985)), and the "No-DutyFor-Sports Rule" (Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 and Ford v. Gouin, 834 P.2d 724) are all
examples of situations where defendant has no duty as per negligent conduct.
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the burden of proof.'52 A plaintiff must prove duty as part of the prima
facie case of negligence regardless of any affirmative defenses. However,
rather than then pleading the affirmative defense of assumption of risk, the
defendant need only negate the duty element of plaintiff's cause of action
(primary assumption of risk). Or, if the duty is established, any "assumption
of risk" on the part of the plaintiff is merely a form of contributory
negligence (secondary assumption of risk). Such a statute would abolish
implied assumption of risk as an affirmative defense and avoid "the all or
nothing aspect" of the rule. 5
CONCLUSION

By a plurality decision, the California Supreme Court in the companion
cases of Knight v. Jewett"5 and Ford v. Gouin55 held primary assumption of risk remained a complete defense to negligence while secondary
assumption of risk was merely a variant of contributory negligence to be
apportioned under the principles of comparative fault. The court did not take
the opportunity to abolish the defense altogether-a conclusion that would
have been consistent with the principles of comparative fault.
The Legislature should recognize the inability of the court to fashion a
majority rule and draft a statute consistent with the rationale of the plurality
of the court. The statute should abolish implied assumption of risk as an
affirmative defense. Primary assumption of risk should be asserted in
pleadings as an answer to whether defendant had a duty as part of the prima
facie cause of action for negligence. Secondary assumption of risk should
then be a factor in allocating fault under comparative negligence principles.
Corey Y. Hoffinann

152. Commentators Wildman and Barker also conclude the abolition of the affirmative
defense of implied assumption of risk will not affect the burden of proof as long as "duty
standards are sufficiently broad and inclusive" to be "fair" to plaintiffs and "fair enough to
defendants... they will not miss the opportunity to litigate issues that would have been raised
by an implied assumption of risk defense." Wildman & Barker, supra note 6, at 679.
153. Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 712 (Cal. 1992).
154. Id.
155. 834 P.2d 724 (Cal. 1992).
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